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1 Introduction
The study of two-sided matching has been mainly devoted to centralized markets. These
matching markets work by having each agent of the two sides of the market submit a
rank ordered preference list of acceptable matches to a central clearinghouse, which then
produces a matching by processing all the preference lists according to some algorithm.
Typically, such mechanisms are deterministic in the sense that the outcome depends on
the submitted lists in a way that involves no element of chance. As a consequence, the
existing results do not generally allow us to address behavior in many labor markets and
other two-sided matching situations where lotteries ultimately determine the outcome. In
discrete problems where agents have opposite interests randomization is surely one of the
most practical tools to achieve procedural fairness.1 Hence, equity considerations provide
an important justication for the introduction of chance in many instances of centralized
matching. On the other hand, lotteries are especially attractive as a means of representing
the frictions of a decentralized market. Indeed, in the extremely complex environment of
a real life market, decentralized decision making will often lead to uncertain outcomes:
the question of who will match with whom depends on the realization of random events
random meetings.
This paper studies a class of matching mechanisms that are random: given agentsbe-
havior, chance determines the nal outcome. These mechanisms may be used in centralized
markets as a means to promote procedural fairness. Or they may arise in the context of
decentralized decision making: starting from an arbitrary matching, agents from the two
sides of the market meet bilaterally in a random fashion. We assume that each individual
has preferences over the other side of the market and the prospect of being unmatched;
however, they are not compelled to behave in a straightforward manner, according to these
true preferences. Instead, agents are confronted with a game in which they act in what
they perceive to be their own best interest. Hence, upon meeting, the paired agents match
1At least to move towards procedural fairness. A random matching mechanism is procedurally fair
whenever the sequence of moves for the agents is drawn from a uniform distribution. See Moulin (1997,
2003).
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if this is consistent with their strategies, and separate otherwise. Since one of the clearest
lessons from the study of deterministic procedures is that understanding such incentives
is crucial to understand the behavior of the market, the paper is devoted to equilibrium
analysis.
Our study was largely motivated by Roth and Vande Vate (1990, 1991). In the context
of the marriage problem where matching is one-to-one, Roth and Vande Vate (1990) proved
that, starting from an arbitrary matching, the decentralized decision making process of al-
lowing randomly chosen blocking pairs to match will converge to a stable matching with
probability one. Under a stable matching no individual or pair of agents has incentives to
circumvent the matching. It is argued that such process can be thought of as an approxi-
mation to real life dynamics. In the related paper Roth and Vande Vate (1991), strategic
considerations are made for the marriage market, focusing on the class of truncation strate-
gies, i.e., strategies that are order-consistent with true preferences, but may regard fewer
partners as acceptable. In a one-period game in which every agent states a list of prefer-
ences and then a matching stable with respect to those preferences is selected at random,
it is shown that all stable matchings can be reached as equilibria in truncations. However
certain unstable matchings can also arise in this way. A multi-period extension is then
considered to rule out such undesirable outcomes.
As in Roth and Vande Vate (1991) we assume that random meeting among agents
will eventually converge to a stable matching with respect to the chosen strategy prole.
Hence, such process induces a lottery exclusively over stable outcomes. However, the
present paper extends their contribution in two ways. First, we take equilibrium analysis
further, going beyond the analysis of truncations. A concept of equilibrium based on
rst-order stochastic dominance is used, given that preferences are ordinal in nature and
probability distributions over matchings are to be compared. The notion of ordinal Nash
equilibrium guarantees that each agent plays his best response to the othersstrategies for
every utility representation of the preferences.2
2This concept was introduced in dAspremont and Peleg (1988); it has been used in the context of voting
theory in Majumdar and Sen (2004) and in matching markets in Ehlers and Massó (2003), Majumdar
2
Second, the analysis is conducted in the context of the college admissions problem.
In this setting, agents belonging to two disjoint sets (henceforth rms and workers) have
preferences over the other side of the market; in addition, each rm can employ at most
some xed number of workers, while each worker can ll only one position. Strategic
issues in this context have been studied for a deterministic stable matching rule. Roth
(1985) shows that no stable matching rule exists that makes it a dominant strategy for
all players to report their true preferences. Moreover, he proves that there are equilibrium
misrepresentations that generate any individually rational matching with respect to the
true preferences.3 Ma (2002) shows that in order to obtain stability with respect to true
preferences, we have to use a renement of the Nash equilibrium concept and restrict
to truncations at the match point (i.e., strategies that preserve the ordering of the true
preferences, but rank as unacceptable all the agents that are less preferred than the current
match). More precisely, all strong equilibria in truncations at the match point produce
stable outcomes. Further, Ma (2002) establishes that every Nash equilibrium prole admits
at most one stable matching with respect to the true preferences; if, indeed, such a matching
is admitted, it will always be achieved.
In this paper we characterize equilibria arising in the game induced by a random stable
matching mechanism, providing simultaneously some results that extend to deterministic
mechanisms. First, we show that when ordinal Nash equilibria are considered, a unique
matching is obtained as the outcome of the random process. In addition, this outcome is
individually rational with respect to the true preferences. Since every individually rational
matching for the true preferences can be achieved as an equilibrium outcome, we establish
that a matching can be reached at an ordinal Nash equilibrium if and only if it is individu-
ally rational for the true preferences. We then turn our attention to equilibria where rms
behave straightforwardly. In fact, there are reasons to contemplate truth telling as a salient
form of behavior in situations involving uncertainty; further, sophisticated strategic play
does not even make sense in settings where rms follow an objective criterion to ll their
(2003), Pais (2004a), and Pais (2004b).
3For a detailed explanation of these and other results see Roth and Sotomayor (1990), a comprehensive
treatment of the matching problem.
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positions. We prove that, even though workers may not play straightforwardly, stability
with respect to the true preferences holds for any matching that results from a play of equi-
librium strategies in which rms reveal their true preferences. Conversely, every matching
that is stable for the true preferences can be achieved as an equilibrium outcome. In clos-
ing, we relate the equilibrium strategy proles in the games induced by both random and
deterministic mechanisms. In particular, for any random stable matching mechanism that
always assigns positive probability to two di¤erent stable matchings (when they exist), we
show that a strategy prole is an ordinal Nash equilibrium if and only if it has a unique
stable matching and it is a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by some deterministic
stable mechanism.
We proceed as follows. In Section 2 we present the college admissions problem and in-
troduce notation. We describe random matching mechanisms and the equilibrium concept
used in Section 3. In Section 4 we turn our attention to individual decision making. The
matching process is modeled as a one-period game and its equilibria are then character-
ized. In Section 5 we briey discuss equilibria in the context of a sequential game. Some
concluding remarks follow in Section 6.
2 The Model
The agents in the college admissions problem are two nite and disjoint sets, the set
W = fw1; :::; wpg of workers and the set F = ff1; :::; fng of rms. We let V = W [ F and
sometimes refer to a generic agent by v, while w and f represent a generic worker and rm,
respectively. Each worker w can work for at most one rm and each rm f has a quota qf ,
the maximal number of workers it may employ.
Each worker w has a complete, transitive, and strict preference relation Pw over the set
F [ fwg. For example, the preferences of w on ff1; f2; f3; f4g [ fwg can be represented
by Pw : f1; f2; w; f3; f4, indicating that the best rm for w is f1, his second choice is f2,
and he prefers being unemployed than working for either f3 or f4. Each rm f also has a
complete, transitive, and strict preference relation Pf over the set W [ ffg. For example,
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the preferences of f on fw1; w2; w3; w4g [ ffg can be represented by Pf : w3; w1; f; w2; w4,
indicating that the best worker for f is w3, its second choice is w1, and it prefers having a
position unlled to hiring any other worker. A worker is acceptable if the rm prefers to
employ him rather than having a position unlled. Formally, the set of acceptable workers
for f is A(Pf ) = fw 2 W : wPffg. Given Pw, we can similarly dene an acceptable rm
and the set of acceptable rms for w as A(Pw) = ff 2 F : fPwwg. In the above examples,
the set of acceptable workers for f is A(Pf ) = fw1; w3g and the set of acceptable rms
for w is A(Pw) = ff1, f2g. We let P = (Pf1 ; :::; Pfn ; Pw1 ; :::; Pwp) denote the prole of
all agentspreferences; we sometimes write it as P = (Pv; P v) where P v is the set of
preferences of all agents other than v. We let Pv denote the set of all possible preference
relations for agent v and let P =
Q
v2V
Pv be the set of admissible preference proles. We
write v0Pvv00 when v0 is preferred to v00 under preferences Pv and we say that v prefers v0 to
v00. Since agents will have to compare two potential partners v0 and v00 that may actually
be the same, we write v0Rvv00 to denote that either v0 = v00 or else v0Pvv00. In this case, we
say that v likes v0 at least as well as v00. The set of agents that v likes at least as well as
v00 is UPv(v
00) = fv0 2 V : v0Rvv00g.
Each rm with quota greater than one must be able to compare groups of workers.
Following Roth (1985), we assume rmspreferences over groups of workers are responsive
to the preferences over single agents. A preference Pf for f over sets of workers is responsive
to its preference Pf over single workers if, for all S 2 2W such that jSj < qf ;
1. for all w, w0 2 WnS, S [ fwg PfS [ fw0g if and only if wPfw0;
2. for all w 2 WnS, S [ fwg PfS if and only if wPff ;
and for all S 2 2W such that jSj > qf , ; PfS.4
Responsive preferences are assumed throughout the paper.
Since rms may have to compare two groups of workers S and S 0 that may actually be
the same, we use Rf , a responsive extension of Rf . We write S RfS 0 to denote that either
4Note that, while Pf is used to compare sets of workers, namely the empty set, Pf compares single
workers and f itself, the latter representing having an unlled position.
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S = S 0 or else S PfS 0. We let U Pf (S) = fS 0 2 2W : S 0 RfSg denote the set of groups of
workers f likes at least as well as S.
An outcome for the college admissions problem (F;W; P ) is a matching, a mapping 
from the set V into 2W [ V satisfying the following:
1. for all w 2 W; either (w) 2 F or else (w) = w;
2. for all f 2 F; j(f)j  qf and (f) 2 2W ;
3. for all (w; f) 2 W  F; (w) = f if and only if w 2 (f).
Observe that, while a worker may be matched to a rm or to himself the latter meaning
being unmatched , a rm is always matched to a subset of workers and being matched to
the empty set stands for being unmatched . We denote the set of all matchings byM.
We can extend preferences over partners to preferences over matchings in the follow-
ing, natural, way: each workers preferences over matchings correspond precisely to his
preferences over his own assignments at the matchings; similarly, rmspreferences over
matchings are tantamount to the preferences over its assignments. For instance, w prefers
 to 0 when (w)Pw0(w), while f prefers  to 0 if (f) Pf0(f).
A matching  is individually rational if, for every w 2 W , (w)Rww and if, for every
rm f and w in (f), wPff .5 A rm f and a worker w are a blocking pair for  if they are
not matched under  but prefer one another to one of their assignments, i.e., w =2 (f) but
fPw(w), wPff , and either (i) j(f)j < qf or (ii) if j(f)j = qf then there exists w0 2 (f)
such that wPfw0. A matching  is stable if it is individually rational and if there is no
blocking pair for . Note that the stability of  depends on preferences over individuals,
irrespective of the responsive extension that is being used. We let IR(P ) and S(P ) denote
the set of all individually rational and the set of all stable matchings respectively with
respect to a prole P . A rm f and a worker w are achievable for each other if f and w
are matched under some stable matching.
5By responsiveness, the latter requirement is equivalent to (f) RfS, for every S  (f).
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The proof of existence of stable matchings in Gale and Shapley (1962) is constructed by
means of the deferred-acceptance algorithm. For a given a preference prole P , proposals
are issued by one side of the market accordingly, while the other side merely reacts to
such o¤ers by rejecting all but the best in P . In the case that rms make job o¤ers,
the algorithm arrives at the rm-optimal stable matching F [P ], with the property that
all rms are in agreement that it is the best stable matching. The deferred-acceptance
algorithm with workers proposing produces the worker-optimal stable matching W [P ]
with corresponding properties. Further, the optimal stable matching for one side of the
market is the worst stable matching for every agent on the other side of the market, a
result presented in Knuth (1976) but attributed to John Conway.
3 Random Matching and Ordinal Nash Equilibria
Many matching markets do not employ centralized procedures. Agents are free to issue
o¤ers and make acceptations and rejections as they please and matching is performed over
the telephone network, using the mail, or through the Internet. In such environments,
randomness determines the order in which agents communicate: it may depend on which
telephone call goes through, on the speed of the mail, or on how fast rms react to even-
tual proposals. When a central clearinghouse does exist, chance is widely used to restore
procedural fairness any deterministic mechanism is bound to favor a subset of the agents
involved. In two-sided matching markets, the need for compromise solutions is especially
intense given the strong polarization of interests of agents reected in the structure of the
set of stable matchings. Some real life applications of random procedures concern alloca-
tion problems as on-campus housing, namely in American universities, or public housing.6
Student placement mechanisms that assign students to colleges are another example of
mechanisms where randomness plays a role, as well as procedures used to match students
to optional courses or even children to summer camps.7 Finally, randomness is present
6See Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (1999).
7See Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez (2003) for a description of student assignment mechanisms.
7
in any matching mechanism where the position in a queue or the order of arrival may
inuence assignments.
Formally, a random matching rule ~' is a mapping from preference proles to lotteries
over the set of matchings: ~' : P  ! 4M. A random matching ~'[Q] is the image
of a preference prole Q under a random matching rule, i.e., a lottery over matchings.
Throughout the paper, we consider only random stable matching rules by restricting the
range of random matching rules to the set of lotteries whose supports are subsets of the sets
of stable matchings, i.e., we consider ~' such that, for every Q in P, the support of ~'[Q],
denoted by supp~'[Q], is included in S(Q). While ~'[Q] denotes a lottery over matchings, we
let ~'v[Q] represent the probability distribution induced over agent vs achievable matches.
Whenever the probability distribution ~'[Q] is degenerate, we abuse the notation slightly
by letting ~'[Q] denote the unique outcome matching; similarly, if the distribution ~'v[Q] is
degenerate for some agent v, ~'v[Q] denotes vs unique match in the random stable matching
~'[Q]. Observe however that in general supp~'[Q] is a subset of the set of stable matchings
S(Q). In contrast, a deterministic matching rule ' is a function from preference proles
to matchings: ' : P  ! M. We consider only deterministic stable matching rules that
produce a unique stable matching '[Q] for every prole of preferences Q. In particular, 'F
and 'W denote the deterministic stable matching rules that yield the rm-optimal F [Q]
and the worker-optimal W [Q] stable matchings, respectively, for every Q in P. Finally,
we let 'v[Q] denote vs partner under the matching '[Q].
In a matching market (F;W; P ), we consider the game induced by a random stable
matching rule ~' in which agents are each faced with the decision of what strategies to
act on. As a rst approach, we examine a one-period game where the strategy space of
player v in the game is the set of all possible preference lists Pv. Given the true preference
ordering Pv, each player v may eventually reveal a di¤erent order Qv over the players on
the other side of the market, and then a matching  stable with respect to the stated
preferences Q is selected at random among all the potential matchings, i.e., the elements
of supp~'[Q]. To be precise, we consider the mechanism (P ; ~'), where P is the set of
admissible strategy proles and ~' is a random stable matching rule; we refer to (P ; ~') as
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a random stable matching mechanism. Once the preferences P of the agents are specied,
the above mechanism induces the game (P ; ~'; P ). Analogously, (P ; ') is a deterministic
stable matching mechanism that induces the game (P ; '; P ). In Section 5, we discuss an
extension of the obtained results to a more complex setting where agentsstrategy spaces
are broader.
In the game (P ; ~'; P ), agents compare probability distributions over matchings when
deciding which strategic course to take. Since preferences are ordinal, there is no natural
utility representation of these preferences for expected utility calculations. It follows that
to address strategic questions we need to develop ideas about what constitutes a best
decisionto be taken by an agent. With this purpose in mind, let Q̂ be a strategy prole and
consider w 2 W . Let ~'w[Q̂](S) be the probability that w obtains a partner in S  F [fwg
when the prole Q̂ is used in the game (P ; ~'; P ); in particular, let ~'w[Q̂](UPw(v)) be the
probability that w is matched to a partner at least as good as v when the prole Q̂ is
used in (P ; ~'; P ). Given a random stable matching rule ~' and given Q̂ w, we say that the
strategyQw stochastically Pw-dominates Q0w if, for all v 2 F[fwg, ~'w[Qw; Q̂ w](UPw(v)) 
~'w[Q
0
w; Q̂ w](UPw(v)). This means that, for all v 2 F [ fwg, the probability of w being
assigned to v or to a strictly preferred agent is higher under ~'w[Qw; Q̂ w] than under
~'w[Q
0
w; Q̂ w]. Similarly, given ~' and given Q̂ f , we say that the strategy Qf stochastically
Pf -dominates Q0f if, for all S 2 2W and for every responsive extension Pf of Pf , we have
~'f [Qf ; Q̂ f ](U Pf (S))  ~'f [Q0f ; Q̂ f ](U Pf (S)). This means that f is not able to increase
the probability of obtaining any set of workers S 0 (with whom it may end up matched)
and all sets ranked higher than S 0 in its list of preferences Pf , when using Q0f instead of
Qf . Hence, if we consider the problem that agent v faces given the strategy choices Q̂ v
of the other players, a particular strategy choice Qv may be preferred if it stochastically
dominates every other alternative strategy. This provides the basis for the solution concept
we will adopt throughout the paper.
Denition 1 The prole of strategies Q is an ordinal Nash equilibrium (ON equilibrium)
in the game (P ; ~'; P ) if, given Q v, Qv stochastically Pv-dominates every alternative strat-
egy Q0v for every agent v.
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It follows from the above denition that Q is an ordinal Nash equilibrium when no
agent v can gain in expected utility terms by unilaterally deviating from Qv, no matter
what utility function is used to represent its true preferences. We will then be concerned in
nding a prole of strategies Q that is a Nash equilibrium for every utility representation
of agentspreferences.
4 Equilibrium Analysis
We now turn to characterize ordinal Nash equilibria in the game induced by a random
stable mechanism. Proposition 1 asserts that no ordinal equilibrium supports more than
one stable matching. Using the decentralized interpretation, we can say that the outcome in
equilibrium is immune to the order in which agents meet when players behave strategically,
even though truth revealing often leads to a lottery over matchings. Agents manipulate to
protect themselves against uncertainty.
Proposition 1 Let Q be an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ). Then, a
single matching is obtained with probability one.
Proof. By contradiction, assume that Q is an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ) and
jsupp~'[Q]j  2. Then, there exists a worker w 2 W and matchings , ̂ 2 supp~'[Q]
such that (w) 6= ̂(w). Let 0(w) be the best match among all given by the elements of
supp~'[Q], i.e., 0(w)Rw(w); for all  2 supp~'[Q]. Let Q0w be such that A(Q0w) = f0(w)g
and let Q0 = (Q0w; Q w): Note that 
0 is stable for Q and, once w changes his strategy, it re-
mains stable forQ0 (it remains individually rational and no blocking pairs emerge). Further,
since the set of matched agents is the same under every stable matching, w is matched to




andQw does not stochastically Pw-dominateQ0w. It follows thatQ is not an ON equilibrium
in (P ; ~'; P ).
As a consequence, in the particular case that the random matching rule always assigns
positive probability to at least two di¤erent matchings (if such matchings exist), the set of
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stable matchings of each ordinal Nash equilibrium is a singleton. In general, however, the
set of stable matchings of an ordinal Nash equilibrium may contain several elements. As
proved in Ma (2002) for a deterministic stable matching rule, the random stable rule then
chooses the matching that is unanimously preferred among all the stable matchings with
respect to the submitted prole.
Lemma 1 Let Q be an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ). Then, for any
matching  2 S(Q),
1. ~'w[Q]Rw(w) for every w 2 W and
2. ~'f [Q] Rf(f) for every f 2 F and every responsive extension Rf of Rf .
Proof. By Proposition 1, ~'[Q] is degenerate. The result then follows from Lemma 6
in Ma (2002).
For illustration, consider the following example.
Example 1 Let F = ff1; f2g, W = fw1; w2g, and qf1 = qf2 = 1. Suppose that the
true preferences are as follows:
Pw1 : f1; f2; w1 Pf1 : w1; w2; f1
Pw2 : f2; f1; w2 Pf2 : w2; w1; f2:
Let Qw1 : f2; f1; w1 and Qw2 : f1; f2; w2 and note that the preference prole Q = (Qw1 ; Qw2 ;
PF ) is an ordinal Nash equilibrium in (P ; 'F ; P ), the game induced by the mechanism that
yields the rm-optimal stable matching. Now let ~' be a random matching rule that assigns
probability 0:5 to both the worker-optimal and rm-optimal stable matchings. Clearly, the
support of the probability distribution induced by ~'[Q] includes both F [Q] = f(f1; w1);
(f2; w2)g and W [Q] = f(f1; w2); (f2; w1)g. By Proposition 1, Q is not an ordinal Nash
equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ). In fact, every worker can successfully deviate. For
example, by using his true preferences, w1 obtains his preferred rm f1 with probability
one. 
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In the context of deterministic mechanisms, Roth (1985) shows that by suitably falsify-
ing their preferences, agents can induce any individually rational matching with respect to
the true preferences. Unfortunately, this is not a very illuminating result: the set of individ-
ually rational matchings includes all the matchings that are remotely plausible. Moreover,
the possibility of sustaining matchings where agents hold non-acceptable partners is not
ruled out, although individual rationality appears to be a minimum requirement for an
equilibrium outcome.
The results that follow establish that  can be supported as an ordinal equilibrium
if and only if it is individually rational. Hence, we provide a complete characterization
of ordinal Nash equilibria outcomes in the game induced by random stable mechanisms.
Furthermore, it can easily be shown that Proposition 3 can be extended to the deterministic
case, providing a necessary condition for Nash equilibria in games induced by deterministic
stable matching mechanisms.
Proposition 2 Let  be any individually rational matching for (F;W; P ) and let ~' be
a random stable matching rule. Then, there exists an ordinal Nash equilibrium Q that
supports  in the game (P ; ~'; P ).
Proof. Let Qw be such that A(Qw) = f(w)g, for every w 2 W , and let Qf be such
that A(Qf ) = (f), for every f 2 F . Clearly, S(Q) = fg and  is reached with probability
one. Moreover, no agent can protably deviate. To see this, take an arbitrary worker w. If
(w) 2 F , the only agent that accepts w is (w): Hence, w faces the choice of holding (w)
or being unmatched. Since (w)Pww by individual rationality of , w has no protable
deviation. If (w) = w, no rm is willing to hire w, so that w has no protable deviation:
his only alternative is to remain unmatched. Now consider f 2 F . If (f) 6= ;, only
those workers in (f) are willing to accept lling a position in f: Moreover, by individual
rationality of , (f) RfS, for every S  (f). If (f) = ;, no worker accepts lling a
position if f . In neither case can f improve upon (f) by deviating. Hence, Q is an ON
equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
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Proposition 3 Let Q be an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ). Then, the
unique equilibrium outcome ~'[Q] is individually rational for the true preferences P .
Proof. By Proposition 1, a degenerate probability distribution is achieved in any
equilibrium play of (P ; ~'; P ). Let us say ~'[Q] = . We will prove that  is individually
rational.
First, by contradiction, assume there exists a worker w such that wPw(w). Suppose
that, instead of acting according to Qw, w uses the strategy Q0w such that A(Q
0
w) = ;
and dene Q0 = (Q0w; Q w): By considering every rm unacceptable, w is alone under
every matching in S(Q0). Hence, 1 = ~'w[Q
0](UPw(w)) > ~'w[Q](UPw(w)) and Qw does not
stochastically Pw-dominate Q0w: It follows that Q is not an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
Now suppose that there is a rm f and a set of workers SG  (f) such that SG Pf(f).
Let SG be, among all the subsets of (f), the one that is preferred by f . Consider Q0f , an
alternative strategy for f , where only the elements of SG are considered acceptable. We
will show that Qf does not stochastically Pf -dominate Q0f .
To start, consider the matching 0 such that 0(f) = SG and 0(f̂) = (f̂), for every
f̂ 6= f . Let SB = (f)nSG (note that SB 6= ;) and Q0 = (Q0f ; Q f ). Now consider the
matching market (F;WnSB; Q0R), where Q0R is the same prole as Q0, but restricted to
WnSB. We will prove that 0 is stable for Q0R in this reduced market. Note that, when
Q is considered, (w) is acceptable for every worker w, all elements in ( f) are acceptable
for every rm f 6= f , and SG is the preferred subset of (f) for f . It follows that 0




f̂ , and either (i) j0(f̂)j < qf̂ or (ii) if j0(f̂)j = qf̂ then there exists
w0 2 0(f̂) such that wQ0R
f̂
w0. Since only the elements of 0(f) are considered acceptable
in Q0R
f̂






is the same strategy as Qf̂ ,
but restricted to WnSB. By denition of 0, we have 0(f̂) = (f̂); for every f̂ 6= f ,
and 0(w) = (w), for every w 2 WnSB. The above expression thus becomes f̂QRw(w),
wQR
f̂
f̂ , and either (i) j(f̂)j < qf̂ or (ii) if j(f̂)j = qf̂ then there exists w0 2 (f̂) such that
wQR
f̂
w0. Hence, in the unrestricted market, f̂Qw(w), wQf̂ f̂ , and either (i) or (ii) holds
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with wQf̂w
0, for some w0 2 (f̂). This means that (f̂ ; w) blocks  under Q, contradicting
 2 S(Q). Thus, 0 is stable in (F;WnSB; Q0R). Note that, since f is matched to SG
under a stable matching, it must hold exactly SG under the rm-optimal stable matching
for (F;WnSB; Q0R), by denition of Q0Rf and of the rm-optimal stable matching.
Suppose SB join in. By Theorem 5.35 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990), every rm must
be at least as well o¤ in the new rm-optimal stable matching. Since only SG are considered
acceptable by f in the strategy Q0f , f cannot improve upon S
G. Thus, it must be matched
to SG under the rm-optimal stable matching of the market (F;W;Q0).
Finally, notice that since j(f)j  qf and SB 6= ;, we have jSGj < qf . Hence, Theorem
5.13 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) guarantees that f must hold the same workers under
every stable matching in (F;W;Q0). Therefore, by deviating and acting according to Q0f ,
f will get SG with probability one instead of (f). Concluding, 1 = ~'f [Q
0](U Pf (S
G)) >
~'f [Q](U Pf (S
G)) and Q is not an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
The above result is as uninformative as large the set of individually rational matchings
may be. Ma (2002) shows that one way to make a sharper prediction of equilibrium out-
comes and guarantee stability is to go as far as rening the notion of Nash equilibrium to
strong Nash and require the use of a particular kind of strategies: truncations at the match
point (i.e., deleting the (m + 1)th and less preferred partners when matched to the mth
choice). We provide a di¤erent su¢ cient condition for stability in the game induced by
a random stable mechanism: every ordinal Nash equilibrium where rms behave straight-
forwardly is stable for the true preferences. Truth telling by rms is natural in markets
where rms obey some kind of objective criterion to ll their positions (e.g., universities
admit students on the basis of examination scores, student placement mechanisms assign
students to public schools according to the area of residence, rms hire workers according
to scores given by recruiting agencies). Moreover, in situations involving uncertainty agents
may have no clue about the form that e¤ective strategies might have and straightforward
behavior is always an easy resort.
Proposition 4 Let Q = (PF ; QW ) be an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ).
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Then, the unique equilibrium outcome ~'[Q] is stable for the true preferences P .
Proof. By Proposition 1, a unique matching is achieved as the outcome of an ON
equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ). Let us say that ~'[Q] = . By Proposition 3,  2 IR(P ). We
will prove that  2 S(P ) by contradiction. Suppose that (f; w) blocks  when the true
preferences are considered, i.e., w =2 (f) but fPw(w), wPff , and either (i) j(f)j < qf
or (ii) if j(f)j = qf then there exists w0 2 (f) such that wPfw0. Consider Q0w, an
alternative strategy for w, such that A(Q0w) = ffg and dene Q0 = (Q0w; Q w). We will
prove that w is matched to f under every matching in S(Q0).
Let  be the matching that corresponds to  in the related marriage market and let f i
denote the position of rm f that either is vacant under  if (i) holds or that is matched
to w0 under  if (ii) holds.8 By Roth (1984a), under every stable matching for Q0, w
is either always unmatched or always matched to (possibly di¤erent) positions in rm
f , the only positions he nds acceptable. Let us assume that w is unmatched. This
implies that every position of rm f , in particular f i, is matched to a worker better
than w under every matching in S(Q0), in particular under the worker-optimal stable
matching W [Q
0]. Thus, W [Q
0](f i)Pf iw. Now wPf if i by assumption and, if (i) holds,
f i = W [Q](f
i), since the same set of agents is unmatched under every stable matching
for Q (Roth, 1984a). If (ii) holds, we have wPf iw0 and, by denition of worker-optimal
stable matching, w0Rf iW [Q](f
i). In either case, W [Q
0](f i)Pf iW [Q](f
i). Nevertheless,
W [Q
0] is the worker-optimal stable matching in the reduced market (F;Wnfwg; QR), with
QR representing the same orderings of preferences as in Q, but restricted to Wnfwg. This
contradicts Theorem 2.25 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) since, under the worker-optimal
stable matching, no rm can be matched to a better worker in the restricted market.
Therefore, w must be matched to a position of rm f under every element of S(Q0).
8Given a college admissions problem (F;W;P ), we can build a related marriage market as follows. Each
rm f is replaced by qf positions of f , say f1, f2,...fqf , so that the agents in the related market are workers
and rm positions. Each of these positions has preferences over workers that are identical to those of f
and each workers preference is modied by replacing f , wherever it appears, by the string f1, f2,...fqf ,
in this order. For more on related marriage problems, see Roth and Sotomayor (1990).
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In conclusion, by acting in accordance with Q0w, w will be matched to f with probability
one. Hence, Qw does not stochastically Pw-dominate Q0w and we have a contradiction: Q
is not an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
Two remarks are in order. First, this result can easily be applied to games arising from
deterministic stable mechanisms: stability for the true preferences is obtained in any Nash
equilibrium where rms are truthful. Second, in accordance with the claims in Roth and
Sotomayor (1990) concerning deterministic mechanisms, the analogous result with workers
telling the truth and rms acting strategically does not hold, although it would hold when
all quotas equal one.9 The college admissions problem, unlike the marriage problem, is
not symmetric between the two sides of the market and there are substantial di¤erences
between the two when strategic issues are contemplated. Any rm with a quota greater
than one resembles something like a coalition rather than an individual. Hence, allowing
for manipulation on the rmsside is similar to giving such powers to sets of agents in a
marriage market and, in equilibria where workers tell the truth, stability is lost.
The converse result is given in Proposition 5, asserting that every stable matching
for the true preferences can be supported as the outcome of an ordinal Nash equilibrium
where rms act according to the true preferences. In fact, workers can compel any jointly
achievable outcome in the game induced by a random stable mechanism, while rms behave
straightforwardly.
Proposition 5 Let  be any stable matching for (F;W; P ) and let ~' be a random stable
matching rule. Then, there exists an ordinal Nash equilibrium Q = (PF ; QW ) that supports
 in the game (P ; ~'; P ).
Proof. Dene Qw such that A(Qw) = f(w)g for every w 2 W . Clearly, S(Q) = fg
and  is reached with probability one.
Let us now prove that Q is an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ). Take an arbitrary worker
w and suppose that there exists a rm f such that fPw(w). We claim that w cannot
9See Roth (1985).
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deviate to get matched to f . In fact, the stability of  with respect to P implies that
either fPfw in which case f declares w unacceptable or, if wPff , then j(f)j = qf and
w0Pfw, for every w0 2 (f). In the latter case, since (w0) = f for every w0 2 (f), then
Qw0 satises A(Qw0) = ffg and f ends up matched to (f). Now consider rm f . The
only workers willing to accept f are those in (f). Furthermore, individual rationality of
 implies that (f) RfS, for every S  (f). It follows that f cannot improve upon (f)
by deviating. In conclusion, Q is an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
Our next results establish a strong link between equilibria in games induced by random
and by deterministic stable mechanisms. We start by pointing out that every ordinal Nash
equilibrium of the random process must be a simple Nash equilibrium of a game induced
by some mechanism where chance plays no role.
Proposition 6 Let Q be an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ). Then, there
exists a deterministic stable matching rule ' such that Q is a Nash equilibrium in the game
(P ; '; P ).
Proof. Assume that Q is an ON equilibrium that yields  in (P ; ~'; P ). Proposition
1 guarantees that  is the only element in supp~'[Q] and, by Proposition 3,  2 IR(P ).
Now suppose, by contradiction, that there exists no game induced by a deterministic stable
matching rule ' where Q is a Nash equilibrium. In particular, consider any ' such that
'[Q] =  such a rule exists since  2 S(Q) and assume that some agent has a protable
deviation.
Let such agent be a worker, w. Then, there exists a strategy Q0w such that 'w[Q
0]
Pw(w), with Q0 = (Q0w; Q w). This implies that 'w[Q
0] 2 F since  2 IR(P ). Let
f = 'w[Q
0] and dene Q00w such that A(Q
00
w) = ffg. Observe that under any matching
in S(Q00w; Q w), w is matched to f '[Q
0] 2 S(Q00w; Q w) since it remains individually
rational and no blocking pairs emerge once w uses Q00w. Therefore, under every matching
in supp~'[(Q00w; Q w)], w holds f and Qw does not stochastically Pw-dominate Q
00
w. We get
a contradiction: Q is not an ON equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
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Now assume that f 2 F can prot by deviating from Qf in (P ; '; P ). This means
that there exists Q0f such that 'f [Q
0] Pf(f), with Q0 = (Q0f ; Q f ). Since  2 IR(P ),
'f [Q
0] 6= ;. Dene Q00f such that only the workers in 'f [Q0] are considered acceptable.
Since '[Q0] 2 S(Q0), once only the workers in 'f [Q0] are considered acceptable by f , we
can guarantee that '[Q0] 2 S(Q00). The denition of Q00f and the fact that under every
stable matching rms have the same number of positions lled (Theorem 5.12 in Roth
and Sotomayor (1990)) imply that f holds 'f [Q
0] in every element of S(Q00). Therefore,
1 = ~'f [Q
00](U Pf ('f [Q
0])) > ~'f [Q](U Pf ('f [Q
0])) = 0 and Q is not an ON equilibrium in
(P ; ~'; P ).
In Proposition 7, we establish a partially converse statement: the set of ordinal Nash
equilibria in the game induced by a random stable mechanism includes all the strategy
proles that are simultaneously equilibria in the games induced by the rules that yield the
rm-optimal and the worker-optimal stable matchings.
Proposition 7 Let Q be a Nash equilibrium in both (P ; 'F ; P ) and (P ; 'W ; P ). Then, Q
is an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ) for any random sable matching rule
~'.
The following Lemma is useful in proving Proposition 7.
Lemma 2 Let Q be a Nash equilibrium in both (P ; 'F ; P ) and (P ; 'W ; P ). Then, the set
S(Q) is a singleton.
Proof. Assume that Q is a Nash equilibrium in both (P ; 'F ; P ) and (P ; 'W ; P ).
Suppose, by contradiction, that jS(Q)j  2. Clearly, this implies that 'F [Q] 6= 'W [Q].
Lemma 1 in Ma (2002) implies that, for any matching  2 S(Q), we have 'Fw[Q]Rw(w),
for every w 2 W . Since Q is an equilibrium in (P ; 'W ; P ), the same lemma guarantees that
'Ww [Q]Rw(w), for every w 2 W and for any  2 S(Q). It follows that 'Fw[Q] = 'Ww [Q],
for every w 2 W and we contradict the initial assumption that 'F [Q] 6= 'W [Q].
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Proof of Proposition 7. Suppose that Q is a Nash equilibrium in both (P ; 'F ; P )
and (P ; 'W ; P ). By Lemma 2, jS(Q)j = 1. Let us say that S(Q) = f̂g and assume, by
contradiction, that there exists a random stable matching rule ~' such that Q is not an ON
equilibrium in (P ; ~'; P ).
Suppose then that there exists a worker w 2 W and an alternative strategy Q0w such
that Qw does not stochastically Pw-dominate Q0w. This implies that there exists  2
supp~'[Q0w; Q w] such that (w)Pw̂(w). Note that, since Q is a Nash equilibrium in the
game induced by a stable matching rule, ̂ 2 IR(P ). Hence, ̂(w)Rww and it must be
the case that w is matched to a rm under every matching in S(Q0w; Q w). Let 
0(w)
be the best match for w in supp~'[Q0w; Q w] and dene Q
00
w such that A(Q
00
w) = f0(w)g.
Since 0 2 S(Q00w; Q w) (it is still individually rational and no blocking pairs emerged),
Theorem 5.12 in Roth and Sotomayor (1990) ensures that w is matched to 0(w) under
every matching in S(Q00w; Q w). Then, in no game induced by a stable matching rule is
Q a Nash equilibrium, since for every stable matching rule ', 'w[Q
00
w; Q w] = 
0(w) and
0(w)Pw̂(w). It follows that no worker can protably deviate in the game induced by ~'.
Then, there exists a rm f and a strategy Q0f such that Qf does not stochastically
Pf -dominate Q0f , i.e., there exists  2 supp~'[Q0f ; Q f ] such that (f) Pf ̂(f). Since ̂ 2
IR(P ), we have ̂(f) Rf; and, under every matching in S(Q0f ; Q f ), f has at least one
position lled. Let 0 be such that 0(f) Pf(f), for every  2 supp~'[Q0f ; Q f ]. Dene Q00f
such that A(Q00f ) = 
0(f). Note that 0 2 IR(Q00f ; Q f ) and that no pair of agents blocks 0
under the preference prole (Q00f ; Q f ). Therefore, 
0 2 S(Q00f ; Q f ) and, since rms have
the same positions lled under every stable matching (Theorem 5.12 in Roth and Sotomayor
(1990)), the denition of Q00f guarantees that f holds 
0(f) in every element of S(Q00f ; Q f ).
Finally, for every stable matching rule ', 'f [Q
00
f ; Q f ] = 
0(f) and 0(f) Pf ̂(f). It follows
that there exists no stable matching rule ' such that Q is a Nash equilibrium in (P ; '; P ),
contradicting the initial assumption.
The proof of the above result reveals that a su¢ cient condition for an ordinal Nash equi-
librium in the game (P ; ~'; P ) is in fact being a Nash equilibrium in every game (P ; '; P ),
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i.e., in every game induced by a deterministic stable mechanism. This appears to be an
extremely strong condition to fulll. Nevertheless, we will now describe a class of random
matching rules for which such condition becomes necessary for an ordinal Nash equilibrium.
In the particular case that I is the empty matching, Roth and Vande Vate (1990) have
shown that, in the marriage model, every element of the set of stable matchings for the
revealed preferences can be achieved with positive probability when the random matching
rule they dene is applied. In fact, starting from a situation in which all agents are
unmatched, by successively satisfying all the pairs of a stable matching, we can guarantee
that this matching is reached with positive probability. This random process is an instance
of what we will name as really random stable matching rule.
A really random stable matching rule ~' assigns positive probability to at least two
di¤erent elements of the set of stable matchings, i.e., jsupp~'[Q]j  2 for every Q such that
jS(Q)j  2. In Example 1, the rule that assigns probability 0:5 to the rm-optimal and to
the worker-optimal stable matchings is clearly a really random stable matching rule. The
following result is an implication of Propositions 6 and 7 in the particular case that ~' is
really random.
Corollary 1 Let ~' be a really random stable matching rule. Then, the prole of strategies
Q is an ordinal Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; ~'; P ) if and only if the set of stable
matchings S(Q) is a singleton and there exists a deterministic stable matching rule ' such
that Q is a Nash equilibrium in the game (P ; '; P ).
Proof. Follows directly from Propositions 6 and 7, and the fact that Proposition 1
implies supp~'[Q] = S(Q) for a really random stable matching rule ~'.
For illustration, consider once more Example 1 and note that the set of stable matchings
for truth telling is a singleton; further, it can easily be shown that it is an equilibrium in
the game induced by the matching rule that yields, say, the rm-optimal stable matching.
Corollary 1 thus implies that straightforward behavior is an ordinal Nash equilibrium in
the game induced by the random stable matching rule described in the example.
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5 Non-Preference Strategies
We have explored the game induced by a random matching mechanism, claiming that
one of the main motivations of this paper is the study of some decentralized markets. This
may be objected on the grounds that up to this point we have restricted our analysis
to a one-period game where strategies are preference lists, which perfectly mirrors the
functioning of a centralized market, but falls short of an illustration of a decentralized
market. In particular, in matching processes of the kind described by Roth and Vande Vate
(1990), at each moment in time, a pair of randomly chosen agents meets and (temporarily)
matches if this is consistent with both agentsstrategies. This clearly ts the structure
of a sequential game. In this context, restricting each agent to hold the potential partner
that is higher on some xed preference ordering sustains the validity of the results of the
preceding section. However, in a sequential game, agents can be expected to use richer
strategies, conditioning behavior on the history of the game, and not necessarily acting
consistently with a unique preference ordering. The strategy of matching with the rst
partner one meets and rejecting every other agent is an example of such kind of strategies.
One of the di¢ culties that arises in attempting to capture such complex forms of be-
havior concerns the very essence of the matching rule that, following Roth and Vande Vate
(1990), we assume to be stable with respect to the revealed preferences. In fact, such de-
nition is compromised when, for some play of the game, no list of preferences is compatible
with the strategy of a player. Hence, the set of feasible strategies of the sequential game is
simply too large and precludes analysis in the theoretical framework we have been using.
One potential course of action is therefore to impose that under any play of the sequen-
tial game the choices actually made are consistent with some preference ordering, even
though they may correspond to incompatible preference orderings when several plays are
considered. We can then speak of preference orderings that are revealedin the course of
the play. A worker w that entertains the described strategy in the example above, would
match the rst rm to tender an o¤er to him under any play of the game, and reveal that
this rm is preferred to every other rm that he eventually meets in the course of that play.
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Since meeting is random, this worker would reveal distinct preference lists under di¤erent
plays of the game.
Hence, consider a sequential game where, starting from an arbitrary matching, at each
moment in time, a pair of randomly chosen agents, composed of a rm and a worker,
meets. Agents match upon meeting if this is consistent with their strategies. We assume
that strategies are restricted to those strategies compatible with a preference ordering
for each play of the game, the revealed preference ordering, even though the information
gathered in the course of the play might allow for other forms of behavior.10 According
to Roth and Vande Vate (1990), once the probability that a given pair of agents meets is
bounded away from zero, each play of the game yields a matching stable with respect to
the revealed orderings in the course of that play. Hence, given a prole of strategies that
meets the above requirement, every outcome obtained with positive probability is stable
for some revealed prole of preferences. We let G(P ) denote this sequential game.
In Proposition 8, we show that ordinal Nash equilibria in preference strategies, which
correspond to those obtained for the one-period game, are robust to the enlarged strategy
space. In fact, given a prole of preference strategies, if by means of a strategy that is
not consistent with a unique preference ordering, an agent may improve his position, he is
certainly capable of doing so using a simple preference strategy.
Proposition 8 In the sequential game G(P ), for any collection of stated preferences Q v
for agents other than an arbitrary agent v, agent v always has a best response that is
consistent with a unique preference ordering.
Proof. First, consider an arbitrary worker w and x Q w. Let sw denote an arbitrary
strategy for w, revealing a preference ordering (not necessarily the same) under each play
of the game. Denote by Qiw the preference ordering that is consistent with sw under
some play i. In general, we have supp~'[sw; Q w] = f1; :::; kg, where i 2 S(Qiw; Q w),
10The lack of precision in dening what each player knows along the game is deliberate. The result that
follows is valid in a perfect information setting, as well as when agents are only partially aware of the
history of the game.
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for i = 1; :::; k. Now let Qw be such that A(Qw) = fj(w)g where j(w)Rwi(w); for
all i 2 f1; :::kg. Since j 2 S(Qjw; Q w), we must have j 2 S(Qw; Q w) (it is still
individually rational and there are fewer blocking pairs). Hence, given that the same
agents are matched under any two elements of the set of stable matchings and the only
rm w nds acceptable is j(w), this worker is matched to j(w) under every matching
in S(Qw; Q w). It follows that any lottery over S(Qw; Q w) gives w a partner at least as
good as any lottery over S(sw; Q w). Since sw and Q w are arbitrary, this completes the
proof for a worker w.
Now take an arbitrary rm f . Let sf denote a strategy for f with the same properties
as the strategy for w above. Dene Qif as the preference ordering over individual workers
that is consistent with sf for some play i of the game. Let supp~'[sf ; Q f ] = f1; :::; kg,
where i 2 S(Qif ; Q f ), for i = 1; :::; k. Consider any alternative strategy Qf for f such
that A(Qf ) = j(f) where j(f) Rfi(f); for all i 2 f1; :::; kg and for every responsive
extension Rf of Rf . Then, j 2 IR(Qf ; Q f ) since j 2 IR(Q
j
f ; Q f ). Moreover, j 2
S(Qf ; Q f ) since j 2 S(Q
j
f ; Q f ) and no blocking pairs emerged. Given that the same
positions of a rm are lled under any element of a set of stable matchings and by denition
of Qf , f is matched to j(f) under every matching in S(Qf ; Q f ). Since sf and Q f are
arbitrary, this completes the proof.
Nevertheless, this is far from being a characterization of equilibria in this new setting. In
fact, the set of ordinal Nash equilibria is larger here, as the following example demonstrates.
Example 2 (Example 1 revisited) Consider the matching market in Example 1. Let
the strategy of each agent be dened as follows: sfi = match only with wi if f1 is the rst
rm to meet a worker; match only with wj otherwiseand swi = match only with fi if f1
is the rst rm to meet a worker; match only with fj otherwise, for i = 1; 2. This strategy
prole leads to a non-degenerate probability distribution over matchings. Namely, both
 = f(f1; w1); (f2; w2)g and ̂ = f(f1; w2); (f2; w1)g are obtained with a 50% probability.
Hence, Proposition 1 rules out the possibility that s can be reproduced by an equilibrium in
preference strategies. Still, s is an ordinal Nash equilibrium, since any unilateral deviation
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of a rm or worker may either leave the probability distribution unchanged or leave the
deviator unmatched with positive probability. 
6 Concluding Remarks
At the expense of using an ordinal equilibrium concept, we have provided a charac-
terization of equilibria that arise in the game induced by a random stable mechanism.
The analysis is set in the college admissions problem. First, we have proved that every
ordinal Nash equilibrium yields a unique matching, while when agents act straightfor-
wardly according to the true preferences several matchings may be obtained with positive
probability. Hence, agents avoid uncertainty when behaving strategically. Furthermore, a
matching can be reached at an ordinal Nash equilibrium if and only if it is individually
rational for the true preferences. Ordinal equilibria where rms best reply by behaving
straightforwardly always produce a matching stable for the true preferences. Conversely,
every stable matching can be reached as the outcome of an equilibrium play of the game.
In a di¤erent direction, we relate ordinal Nash equilibria in games induced by a random
matching mechanism with Nash equilibria arising in the games induced by deterministic
matching mechanisms. In particular, a preference prole is an ordinal equilibrium of the
game induced by a matching rule that always assigns positive probability to two di¤erent
matchings (if such matchings exists) if and only if the set of stable matchings is a singleton
and it is a Nash equilibrium in the game induced by some deterministic stable rule. In
the last section of the paper we have tried to extend the above results, derived for a one-
period game where the set of available strategies coincides with the set of all possible lists
of preferences, to the sequential game that may arise in a decentralized market. Here we
assume agents may use strategies that correspond to di¤erent preference orderings when
di¤erent plays of the game are considered. We have shown that ordinal Nash equilibria in
preference strategies are robust to the enlarged strategy space.
In what the above results are concerned, a couple of remarks is in order. The rst obser-
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vation concerns fairness and random matching mechanisms. In opposition to deterministic
mechanisms, which are bound to favor one side of the market over the other, we have
claimed that random mechanisms promote procedural fairness.11 Nevertheless, endstate
justice is a di¤erent issue. Indeed, the results that relate equilibria in the games induced by
random and deterministic mechanisms imply that every equilibrium outcome in the game
induced by a random matching mechanism may be obtained by means of a deterministic
mechanism. It follows that, based on these results and in what endstatejustice is con-
cerned, we should not expect random matching rules to improve upon deterministic ones
if equilibrium behavior is to be taken seriously.
Second, the aim of the last section is to shed some light on what happens once we
move towards allowing for history-dependent strategies, preserving the stability of the
mechanism. The purpose of this paper is to explore strategic behavior induced by random
stable matching mechanisms, and not to provide a thorough analysis of the incentives
agents face in decentralized markets.12 Therefore, relaxing the restriction we impose over
the strategy sets would compromise our main goal.
To conclude, equilibrium behavior in randommechanisms has barely been treated in the
matching literature. One of the di¢ culties that arises in attempting to apply the common
game theoretical tools stems from the need to compare the probability distributions over
matchings generated by a random rules when preferences are ordinal. By means of the
concept of ordinal Nash equilibrium we have taken a step towards lling the gap in the
literature, providing a fairly complete characterization of equilibrium behavior.
11For example, in the kind of process described in Roth and Vande Vate (1990), each pair of agents
has the same probability of meeting at a certain point in the procedure, and this determines procedural
fairness.
12In this connection, see Pais (2004a).
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